Terça-feira, 9 de Agosto de 2011

The metaphor - "resembles something that as not ocurred"

 

 

 

 

From sense

 

"I wish I were the night so that I might watch your sleep with a thousand eyes"

 

to reference

 

"In order to speak of the sense of an expression 'A' one may simply use the phrase 'the sense of the expression "A"'. In reported speech one talks about the sense, e.g., of another person's remarks. It is quite clear that in this way of speaking words do not have their customary reference but designate what is usually their sense. In order to have a short expression, we will say: In reported speech, words are used indirectly or have their indirect reference. We distinguish accordingly the customary from the indirect reference of a word; and its customary from its indirect sense. The indirect reference of a word is accordingly its customary sense. Such exceptions must always be borne in mind if the mode of connexion between sign, sense, and reference in particular cases is to be correctly understood.

The reference and sense of a sign are to be distinguished from the associated idea. If the reference of a sign is an object perceivable by the senses, my idea of it is an internal image, arising from memories of sense impressions which I have had and acts, both internal and external, which I have performed. Such an idea is often saturated with feeling; the clarity of its separate parts varies and oscillates. The same sense is not always connected, even in the same man, with the same idea. The idea is subjective: one man's idea is not that of another. There result, as a matter of course, a variety of differences in the ideas associated with the same sense. A painter, a horseman, and a zoologist will probably connect different ideas with the name 'Bucephalus'. This constitutes an essential distinction between the idea and the sign's sense, which may be common property of many and therefore not a part of a mode of the individual mind. For one can hardly deny that mankind has a common store of thoughts which is transmitted from one generation to another.

In light of this, one need have no scruples in speaking of the sense, whereas in the case of an idea one must, strictly speaking, add to whom it belongs and at what time. It might perhaps be said: Just as one man connects this idea, and another that idea, with the same word, so also one man can associate this sense and another that sense. But there still remains a difference in the mode of connexion. They are not prevented from grasping the same sense; but they cannot have the same idea. Si duo idem faciunt, non est idem. If two persons picture the same thing, each still has his own idea. It is indeed sometimes possible to establish differences in the ideas, or even in the sensations, of different men; but an exact comparison is not possible, because we cannot have both ideas together in the same consciousness.

(...)

The fact that we concern ourselves at all about the reference of a part of the sentence indicates that we generally recognize and expect a reference for the sentence itself. The thought loses value for us as soon as we recognize that the reference of one of its parts is missing. We are therefore justified in not being satisfied with the sense of a sentence, and in inquiring also as to its reference. But now why do we want every proper name to have not only a sense, but also a reference? Why is the thought not enough for us? Because, and to the extent that, we are concerned with its truth value. This is not always the case. In hearing an epic poem, for instance, apart from the euphony of the language we are interested only in the sense of the sentences and the images and feelings thereby aroused. The question of truth would cause us to abandon aesthetic delight for an attitude of scientific investigation. Hence it is a matter of no concern to us whether the name 'Odysseus', for instance, has reference, so long as we accept the poem as a work of art. It is the striving for truth that drives us always to advance from the sense to the reference."

 

 

(obrigado à João pelo JLB)

 


publicado por quaerendoinvenietis às 01:47
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Segunda-feira, 8 de Agosto de 2011

Esta música fala da sua própria estrutura

 
 
 
 
 
 
 

publicado por quaerendoinvenietis às 23:56
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Quinta-feira, 21 de Julho de 2011

We can never outdo, or so they say...

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

………………
Gödel's theorem may seem, at first sight,
rather nondescript,
but please keep in mind:
Gödel is right.
"In any sufficiently rich system
statements are possible
which can neither be proved
nor refuted within the system,
unless the system itself
is inconsistent."
You can describe your own language
in your own language:
but not quite.
You can investigate your own brain
by means of your own brain:
but not quite.
Etc.
In order to be vindicated
any conceivable system
must transcend, and that means,
destroy itself.
"Sufficiently rich" or not:
Freedom from contradiction
is either a deficiency symptom,
or it amounts to a contradiction.
(Certainty = Inconsistency.)
……………….

 

Daqui


publicado por quaerendoinvenietis às 22:15
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